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Many of the major disputes in substantive
criminal law today concern the general require-
ment that for conviction a culpable mental attitude
must be concurrent with the proscribed conduct,
circumstances, and consequences that constitute
the material elements of an offense. Perfect ad-
herence to the rule would demand the abolition
of strict-liability welfare offenses, which require no
proof of mental attitude. It would put an end to
the felony-murder doctrine by prohibiting the sub-
stitution of an intent to commit a forcible felony
for an intent to kill. Literal compliance with the
mental attitude requirement would permit the
defense of mistake whenever the mistake leaves
the act unaccompanied by a culpable mental atti-
tude. Finally, it would permit the defense of
drunkenness to all criminal charges, because other-
wise intentionality or recklessness toward getting
drunk would be substituted for intentionality or
recklessness toward a more grievous harm.
It is not enough, however, to assert a priori
that the criminal law should never dispense with
the mental attitude requirement. For example,
those who advocate recognition of the absolute
defense of drunkenness must do more than note
that failure to recognize the defense leads to pun-
ishing differently men whose only culpability was
in getting drunk, but who, in their stupors, hap-
pened to cause harms varying in degrees of seri-
ousness. The observation that certain exceptions
to the mental attitude requirement have evolved
over the years is merely the beginning of inquiry.
Further development of the criminal law should
turn upon a critical consideration of the question
when, if ever, should the law in meting out punish-
ment increase its emphasis upon harm by relaxing
the usual mental attitude requirement.
This essay first explores the nature of the gen-
eral requirement, defining the basic mental atti-
tudes that support criminality and noting that
they do not necessarily involve ultimate moral
blameworthiness. It treats the principle of con-
currence, which specifies that each material ele-
ment of an offense has its own mental attitude
requirement and that, for instance, intentionality
toward one material element of an offense cannot
be substituted for intentionality toward another
material element. The essay then comments upon
certain difficulties encountered in determining what
mental attitude is signified by certain statutory
language and in deciding to which element of a
statutory offense a particular mental attitude
modifier applies.
The essay then explores a few exceptions that
have developed. It inquires whether the denial of
the defense of mistake to a bigamy charge is justi-
fied by worthy and attainable goals that compen-
sate for the possibility of jailing non-culpable
parties. It asserts that the denial of the defense of
mistake to a statutory rape charge should be eval-
uated in light of the history and the purpose of
that offense. It condemns the widespread use of
strict-liability welfare offenses on policy grounds
that go beyond a mere assertion that it is always
and everywhere wrong to abolish the mental at-
titude requirement in criminal law.
A similar analysis, not here provided, would be
in order in the felony-murder and the defense-of-
drunkenness debates. The ultimate questions in
the felony-murder dispute, for example, will not
be answered by a search for some logical rule of
transferred intent (and of causation) without re-
flection upon what society seeks to gain by pun-
ishing as murder certain unintentional homicides,
how worthy and attainable are its goals, and what
is the price to be paid for a rule designed to attain
those goals.
Finally, the student of criminal law muct ac-
knowledge that sometimes society is so outraged
by a harm that it punishes the person who caused
the harm with little concern over his mental atti-
tude toward the harm. Although modern societies
no longer punish negligent homicide as severely
as intentional homicide, they often do punish
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negligent (or even non-negligent) bigamy as se-
verely as deliberate bigamy. Society may also be
too frenzied to accept the explanation that a man
actually and reasonably believed his partner was
above the critical age in statutory rape cases, even
though the general mental attitude requirement
dictates that the explanation be accepted. Simi-
larly, in its outrage over a brutal death, society
may not be sophisticated enough to appreciate
that the killer's recklessness lay in placing himself
in a drunken state-a not uncommon phenome-
non-and was unrelated to the unfortunate harm
that resulted. In such cases, the student of crimi-
nal law should recognize the process that is taking
place when the mental attitude requirement is
relaxed and should point out those instances
where outrage untempered by reason is reflected
in our penal laws. This essay does, however, sug-
gest that, in certain instances, the Federal Consti-
tution may prohibit the abolition of the mental
attitude requirement.
Tm MENTAL ATnrrDEs
Ordinarily a man may not be convicted of a
crime without proof that he had a particular mental
attitude toward the conduct, circumstances, and
consequences that constitute the material elements
of the offense (the aches reus). The prosecutor must
present evidence or, in some cases, rely upon a
rebuttable presumption arising from the defend-
ant's actions that the particular mental attitude
existed. Mental attitudes that support criminal
liability are intentionality, recklessness, and, less
frequently, negligence. Different mental attitudes
may be sufficient as to different material elements
of the same offense. For example, a rape convic-
tion may require proof that the defendant inten-
tionally had sexual intercourse; but, as to the
non-consent of the female, the prosecution need
only show that his conduct was reckless,' or simply
negligent.' The requisite mental attitude must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and instruc-
tions to the jury that do not make this clear are
fatally defective. 3
Intentionality
An intentionality requirement is indicated by
the word knowingly or the phrase "with intent to."
IA. L. I. MODEL PENAL CODE §2.02, comment at
124 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).2 State v. Dizon, 47 Hawaii 444, 390 P.2d 759,
769 (1964).
3 United States v. Byrd, 352 F.2d 570 (2d Cir.
1965).
As to circumstances that are material elements of
a crime, the actor must be aware of their existence
to satisfy an intentionality requirement.4 As to
conduct and results, the actor must either have a
conscious object to engage in the proscribed
conduct or to cause the forbidden result, or he
must know that he is engaging in such conduct
and know that it is "practically certain that his
conduct will cause such a result".2 For instance, if
D, an unskilled marksman, shoots at V from a
great distance with a weapon he knows is faulty,
although he realizes the chances of killing V are
remote, if he really desires to slay V with the
bullet, the requisite intentionality for murder is
present. In the American Law Institute's Model
Peuzl Code terminology, D has acted purposely
but not knowingly.6 Conversely, if D shoots
through a door to kill V, even though D would
prefer not to damage the door, his awareness of
the certainty that the door will be damaged
satisfies an intentionality requirement according to
the familiar maxim that man is presumed to
intend the natural consequences of his acts. In
Model Penal Code terminology, D has acted know-
ingly but not purposely7 Either mental attitude
will suffice when the relevant statute calls for
proof of intentionality8
Recklessness
Recklessness often suffices to support criminal
liability. In these cases the state satisfies its burden
by establishing that the defendant acted either
intentionally or recklessly as to the conduct,
circumstances, and results that make up the
offense. Treatise writers and the drafters of the
Model Penal Code depart from the notions of reck-
4 M ODEL PENAL CODE §2.02 (2) (a)(ii) & (b)(i)
(Proposed Official Draft, 1962). It should be noted,
however, intentionality as to circumstances is usually
not required; proof of recklessness as to their existence
suffices.
5 MODEL PENAL CODE §2.02 (2) (a)(i), (b)(i), & (b)
(ii) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
6 The example is from Ssaxi & HOGAN, CRIMINAL
LAW 35-36 (1965).
7 See WILIAMS, CRIMINalAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART
§18 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Wn~rAms].
8 The Model Penal Code drafters kept knowledge
separate from purpose in defining the requisite mental
attitudes toward circumstances, conduct, and results,
although they conceded that rarely is one attitude
insufficient where the other attitude will support a
conviction. MODEL PENAL CODE §2.02, comment at
125 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). In fact they could not
illustrate with an example where it would make a
difference. They mentioned specific-intent crimes,
which do require that the actor act purposely. But the
reference is inapposite when we are discussing mental
JAMES B. HADDAD
lessness found in the Restatement of Torts9 and in
the criminal case law by emphasizing the actor's
conscious advertence to risk,"0 instead of finding
recklessness without advertence so long as there
is a gross deviation from a reasonable-man stand-
ard." The Model Penal Code, while requiring gross
deviation, considers the deviation from the view-
point of an actor who knew only what the defend-
ant knew and not what he should have known; it
finds recklessness only where the defendant actu-
ally knew of the risks and not where he merely
should have known of them."2 The arguments over
imposing criminal punishment for gross negligence
under the rubric of "recklessness" are similar to
the arguments over imposing penalites for ordinary
criminal negligence and do not warrant separate
treatment."
attitudes toward material elements of an offense. The
conscious object in specific-intent crimes refers to
conduct or results that are not material elements of the
offense. See infra p. 8. It is submitted that whenever
intentionality as to a material element is called for,
courts will be satisfied with the presumption that man
intends the natural consequences of his acts. In short,
they will not require that the defendant have acted
purposely as long as he acted knowingly. If a distinc-
tion between acting knowingly and acting purposely
should ever be crucial, a jury might have some difficulty
in grasping the difference. Kuh, A Prosecutor Considers
the Model Penal Code, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 608, 622-623
(1963).
9 RESTATEMENT (2d) or TORTS §500 (1965).
10 WiLL"ias §24; SaTsm & HOGaN, cRunNAL LAw 37
(1965). Hall is most insistent on this point because he
believes that criminal liability should not be imposed
absent advertence. Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be
Excluded From Penal Liability, 63 CoLum. L. REv.
632 (1963).
"1 The annotations under almost every manslaughter
statute yield cases that hold that criminal liability
may be imposed where defendant should have ad-
verted to the possibility of harm but did not. See, e.g.,
Chandler v. State, 79 Okl. Cr. 323, 146 P.2d 598(1944); People v. Mason, 198 Misc. 452, 97 N.Y.S.2d
462 (Steuben County Ct. 1950), appeal dismissed,
306 N.Y. 857, 118 N.E.2d 914 (1954). Judges ignore
Hall when he says that recklessness "is no more a
degree of negligence than is intention." HALL, GENERAL
PiNncrPiLs or CEnaNAL LAW 128 (2d ed. 1960)
[hereinafter cited as HALL].
"2MODEL PENAL CODE §2.02 (2)(c) (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962).
"One of the few differences is that a gross-negli-
gence standard might have a general deterrent effect
of less force than a mere negligence standard, but of
more effect than a standard that required actual
advertence. On a retributive theory, punishment of
gross negligence, and not of negligence, would mean
that only those people most insensitive to society's
values or least able to conform to those values would
be punished criminally.
Negligence
Negligence was first used as a basis of criminal
liability in the law of homicide, 4 and is still used
more frequently in that area than in others. It is a
mental attitude upon which criminality is not
often predicated." There is a trend away from its
use in the criminal law.6 To merit criminal
sanctions negligence must be of a more serious
sort than the minimum negligence upon which
tort liability may be based. 7 The Model Penal Code
says negligence exists when a defendant's failure
to perceive substantial and unjustified risks in-
dicated gross deviation from ordinary care." Even
where the law permits convictions for negligently
caused harms, juries sometimes refuse to convict
unless something more than negligence is proved.9
Because a person can be negligent without ever
adverting to the possible harm, negligence is of an
order different from intentionality and from reck-
lessness, as it is defined by modem writers, who
note that negligence is not even a state of mind in
the same sense as are intentionality and reckless-
ness.
20
Punishment of a person who was unaware of the
dangerousness of his behavior or who caused harm
because he lacked the capabilities of the mythical
reasonable man reflects an unsophisticated sort of
retribution that focuses on the harm done rather
than upon the actor's state of mind. On the other
hand, it is possible that frequent criminal punish-
ment of negligent deeds could raise the general
standard of care in a community. The issue is
whether the goal of general deterrence justifies
punishing individual instances of negligence, which,
by definition, are morally innocent." Hall has
14 Perkins, Alignment of Sanction with Culpable
Conduct, 49 IowA L. REv. 325, 359 (1964).
isId. MODEL PENAL CODE §2.02 (3) (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962) and ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38,
§4-3 (b) (1965) both dictate that recklessness be the
minimum attitude that will support conviction where
a statute is silent on the matter.
16 HALL, supra note 10, at 634.
17 People v. Hoffman, 162 Misc. 677, 294 N.Y.S. 444,
446 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1937); State v. Bast, 116 Mont.
329, 151 P.2d 1009, 1012-13 (1944).
"8MODEL PENAL CODE §2.02 (2)(d) (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962).
9 KALvEN & ZEiSEL, Tim ArmERnCA JuxY 324-28
(1966).
2"HALL 114; WnmAS §14. For this reason the
term mens rea is avoided in this essay. Although some
writers equate mens rea with any mental attitude
upon which criminal liability is predicated, Hall and
Williams define mens rea to exclude negligence.
21 Blameless conduct is often punished because the
law does not take account of motive; but usually this
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argued vigorously against punishing negligent
conduct, noting the difference between raised eye-
brows and tort judgments and the imposition of
a jail sentence.2n But even the drafters of the Model
Penal Code found his position "too far out of line
with existing law and present thinking for in-
clusion" in the Code.E
THE P CicIaPL or CoNcuRRFNcE
The General Rule
Generally a mental attitude toward a material
element of one offense may not be replaced by a
qualitatively similar mental attitude toward a
material element of the same or of a different
offense. Stated less abstractly, this means that if
D, intending to kill V, recklessly damages property
with his gunfire, he must be acquitted of any
malicious damage charge that requires proof of an
intention to damage property. The intent to
murder will not suffice in the place of an intent to
damage property because different material ele-
ments are involved.2 4 Conversely, an intent to kill
V with a bullet in his head will support a convic-
tion for intentionally killing even if the fatal
bullet enters V's heart because the material
element is "killing," and because the law is
unconcerned with the manner of the killing 25
Similarly, if D, intending to shoot V, recklessly
kills B, he is guilty of intentionally killing a
human being. The critical material element is "a
human being". The law is violated so long as D
kills some human being with the intent to kill a
human being. This last example illustrates the
principle of "transferred intent".
In the case of conduct, the principle of con-
currence requires that the state of affairs which
make up the material elements of the crime be
causally connected to conduct that is a manifesta-
tion of the requisite mental attitude. For instance,
D, lying in ambush with intent to kill V, toys
with a gun, reckless to the safety of people in the
is a problem of definition and administration: how to
convict the thousand immoral thieves and yet acquit
the one who stole for the best of reasons? See infra
p. 9. On the other hand, liability for mere negligence,
by definition, always involves morally blameless con-
duct.
22 HAL, supra note 10, at 641.
23 PERips, supra note 14, at 361.
24 This is an updated version of Reg. v. Pembliton,
[1874] 12 Cox Crim. Cas. 607, All E.R. 1163.
25This example and some of the following are
borrowed from Sm=r & HoGAw, CRIHE4AL LAW 41-42(1965).
vicinity. The gun discharges and kills V, who, un-
known to D, has just appeared. D should not be
convicted of intentionally killing V since V's
death was not the product of D's intentionality.
D is guilty only of reckless homicide.
Rigid adherence to the principle of concurrence
has shaped the development of the criminal law,
especially the law of theft. At common law D
could be convicted neither of conversion nor of
larceny when, with knowledge of true ownership,
he decided to keep property that he had taken as a
bailee or in the mistaken belief that it was his own.
The requisite criminal intent was neither tempo-
rally nor causally related to the taking of, or
trespass against, the property of another, which
are material elements of those crimes. Therefore,
the crimes of embezzlement and larceny by bailee
were developed to fill the void, with the material
element of "keeping" replacing the element of
"taking" so that there would be a proscribed harm
concurrent with the belated criminal intent28
Some Exceptions
Occasionally society is so outraged by a harm
and the surrounding circumstances that it combines
the mental attitude toward one course of conduct
with the material elements of a more serious offense
and imposes the more severe penalty. For instance,
if D, intending to commit a forcible felony, unin-
tentionally kills V in the course of the felony, he
may be convicted of murder. Similarly, the intent
to commit a misdemeanor may be combined with
a death unintentionally caused to make D guilty
of manslaughter. When drunkenness prevents D
from entertaining any of the requisite criminal
mental attitudes, his intent or recklessness in
getting drunk, in some jurisdictions, is sufficient to
hold D criminally liable for the harms he causes
while drunk. Further, if D, intending to kill V,
carries out his plan, believes he has succeeded, and
disposes of the "body" reckless to the fact that V
is alive and only slightly wounded, and negligent
to the fact that the manner of disposition will
probably kill a living human being, society will
demand that D be convicted of intentionally
killing V even though V's death was not the
product of D's intentionality.Y
26HA 186-87.
27See Jackson v. Commonwealth, 100 Ky. 239,
38 S.W. 422, 1091 (1896); Thabo Mell v. Reginam,
[1954] 1 All E.R. 373. The writers (except for HA
189) and the judges, in order to do "justice," resort
to the loose sort of fiction that was not tolerated in
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The Specific-Intent Exception
Crimes of specific intent require an additional
mental attitude which is unrelated to the material
elements of an offense in any dimension other than
time. They violate the principle of concurrence in
that this mental attitude has no corresponding
material element. While intentionally, recklessly,
or negligently engaging in the conduct that, when
coupled with the requisite .mental element, con-
stitutes the offense, the actor has the conscious
object of engaging in certain other conduct or
achieving a certain result that is not a material
element of the offense. For example, the proscribed
harm of common law larceny (breaking and enter-
ing a dwelling house at night) must be accompanied
by the conscious object of committing larceny or
some other felony. But that other harm need not
actually occur since its occurrence is not a material
element of the offense, as is the breaking and
entering.
Attempt is the most widely prosecuted specific-
intent crime. Under modem attempt statutesn a
substantial step toward a violation of a penal law
must be intentionally, recklessly, or negligently
taken; and it must be accompanied by the con-
scious object of engaging in conduct that is
criminal, and not just of engaging in that sub-
stantial step. Common-law conspiracy illustrates
that the conscious object in specific-intent crimes
need not always be the engagement in an activity
or the achievement of a result that is itself criminal.
There the specific-intent requirement might be
satisfied by the conscious object of engaging in
conduct that is immoral but not independently
illegal; the crime may be committed without
the attainment of the immoral object.
A specific-intent requirement may serve to in-
crease the grade of the offense, as when assault
with intent to kill is punished more severely than
simple assault. This may explain why the intent to
get drunk cannot replace a specific intent even in
those jurisdictions that substitute the intent to
get drunk for intent as to a material element of
the development of the law of larceny: D's activities
are all one course of conduct, and the time of the wrong
is insignificant. WnLiriAs §65, at 174. The case does
differ from the ambush hypothetical in that there D
never manifested his intentionality, and he might have
changed his mind before so manifesting it. However,
this merely justifies punishment for attempt in the
body-disposition case and not in the ambush hypo-
thetical. But on the analysis of the judges and most of
the writers, the ambush case should also support a
conviction for intentional killing.
2' See, e.g., ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 38, §8-4 (1965).
the offense20 But by preventing the formation of
a specific intent, drunkenness may require acquit-
tal, rather than a reduction of the charge, when
larceny or forgery is alleged.30
More Exceptions to Follow
Subsequent parts of this essay3' explore excep-
tions to the principle of concurrence found in
offenses which do not require that the actor have
any particular mental attitude toward certain
material elements of the crimes. For example,
most states allow conviction for statutory rape
even though the defendant was not even negligent
in arriving at his mistaken belief that the material
element of "under age" was not present. Similarly,
many states permit conviction for possession of
narcotics even though the defendant reasonably
believed that the substance he possessed was not a
narcotic, that is to say, even though he lacked
intentionality, recklessness, and negligence toward
a crucial material element of the offense. "Strict
liability" is the generic adjective for crimes that
call for no proof of the defendant's mental attitude
toward one or more of the material elements of the
offense.
INTENT VERSUS MOTIVE
Except where the principle of concurrence is
violated, criminality today depends upon the
actor's mental attitude (intentionality, reckless-
ness, negligence) toward the material elements of
an offense. It does not depend upon proof of an
ultimate moral blameworthiness, if it ever did.32
For this reason it is commonly said that proof of
motive--the force that created the requisite men-
tal attitude"-is unimportant in the criminal law.
"A crime may be committed from the best of
motives and yet remain a crime." "An act per-
formed for a laudable or even a religious motive
may constitute a crime."35 "The mother who kills
her imbecile and suffering child out of motives of
21 See, e.g., Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401 (1870).
10 Alden v. Montana, 234 F. Supp. 661 (D. Mont.
1964), aff'd sub nor. Ellsworth v. Alden, 345 F.2d
530 (9th Cir. 1965).
"1 See infra p. 11.
12 Sayre, The Present Significance of Mens Rea in
the Crininal Law, in HARvARD LEGAL EssAYs 399, 412
(1934).3 In State v. Logan, 344 Mo. 351, 126 S.W.2d 256(1939), the court observed that it is difficult to imagine
a criminal act that does not involve some desire beyond
the act itself. See generally WnnrAL s §21.
4Wi.riss §14, at 31.
20 Sayre, supra note 32.
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compassion is just as guilty of murder as is the
man who kills for gain, since each intentionally
takes another human life.""3 "An accused can
steal to prevent his family from starving or kill to
rid the community of a menace, but the laudatory
qualities of the design do not absolve him from the
application of the criminal law."7 A prosecutor
who violates a wiretapping statute is not saved by
his commendable motives.B Nor, at this writing,
does the gambler who fails to pay his federal gam-
bling tax out of fear of incriminating himself with
state authorities have a good defense because crim-
inality "does not depend upon a determination of
predominant motivation".30
If proof of motive were essential for conviction,
administrative difficulties would be multiplied.
The state would be required to prove the why of
the crime, and the jury would be "compelled to
analyze the psyche of each defendant" and judge
whether it was malignant.4 For this reason, Hall
suggests" that when a crime is committed from
commendable motives leniency in sentencing is a
better remedy than acquittal:
Mitigation is, of course, very much in order
in such cases, but full exculpation would not
only contradict the values of penal law; it
would also undermine the foundation of a
legal order. (42]
Despite administrative difficulties, motive some-
times does play an important role in the criminal
law. In cases depending upon circumstantial
evidence, proof of motive may establish an ante-
cedent probability of defendant's committing the
offense.4' Under modem obscenity statutes" and
cases45 bad motive has an even greater evidentiary
value, to the point that proof of bad motives seems
30 Smnz & HOGAN, CRMIAL LAW 43 (1965).
37 Morss v. Forbes, 24 N.J. 341, 132 A.2d 1, 10
(1957).
2Id.
31United States v. Magliano, 336 F.2d 817, 820(4th Cir. 1964). But where the self-incrimination
possibility is a valid defense, motive for the proscribed
conduct becomes relevant to criminality. This would
be true in cases like Magliano itself if the Supreme
Court should someday accept the self-incrimination
argument.
40 Morss v. Forbes, 24 NJ. 341, 132 A.2d 1, 11(1957).41 HALL 102.42HALL 97.
43 State v. Hansen, 195 Oreg. 169, 244 P.2d 990,
1001 (1952).
"See, e.g., ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 38, §11-20 (c)
(1965).41See, e.g., Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S.
463 (1966).
essential for conviction.4 6 Criminal libel convic-
tions often depend upon proof of a bad motive or
an evil heart. When statutory words like wil/ully
and maliciously are used, proof of a bad motive is
sometimes required, a phenomenon to be sub-
sequently discussed.0 The defense of "necessity"
on occasion wins acquittal rather than pardon
following conviction.4' The previously discussed
administrative difficulties increase with each new
exception that makes criminality depend upon
motive. Ideally, proof of a bad motive should
never be required for conviction."
STATUTORY PROBLEMS
Numerous Modifiers
The use of a few categories to characterize
distinct mental attitudes relevent to all statutory
offenses represents an ideal that few American
jurisdictions have achieved. The economical sys-
tematization in this area represents one of the
Model Penal Code's finest achievements. 50 Un-
fortunately, most legislatures use a multitude of
words such as -maliciously, corruptly, wantonly,
wilfully, feloniously, and unlawfully. The problem
of determining what mental attitude is described by
such words is illustrated by the two examples
that follow.
The word malice formerly, and occasionally to-
day, required proof of a bad motive or purpose, an
evil mind or a wicked heart.6 Because of the
difficulties of proving bad motive as an element of
an offense, this interpretation was widely criti-
cized. 5 As a result, proof of a bad motive is
46 For this reason it is ironic that an old obscenity
case, United States v. Harmon, 45 F. 414 (D. Kan.
1891), is still cited to support the notion that criminal-
ity does not depend upon motive. In the obscenity
area, as in criminal defamation, it is often difficult to
distinguish specific intent from motive. A statute could
require proof of a specific intent to profit financially and
make irrelevant proof of predominant motive (to be
able to support one's children, to be able to buy liquor,
etc.). But bad motive in present obscenity law seems
closer to predominant motivation than specific intent
takes us.
47 See, infra p. 11.
4 See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §7-13 (1965).
49 The interpretive, administrative, and evaluational
problems involved suggest, for instance, that a codi-
fication of a defense of necessity will present more
problems than can be tolerated.
0 See generally Wechsler, On Culpability and Crime:
The Treatment of Mens Rea in the Model Penal Code,
339 AN.Ar.s 24, 25-26 (1962).
6"EDwARDs, MENs REA IN STATUTORY OFIENCES
6 (1955). See State v. Pudman, 65 Ariz. 197, 177 P.2d
376 (1946).
&2 EDwARDs, supra note 51, at 7.
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generally unnecessary today even when malice is
used in a statute." By now it "is a commonplace
that 'malice' in the law generally means intention
or recklessness". 4 Infrequently it is suggested that
a man cannot act maliciously unless he knows not
just the nature of his conduct but also the meaning
of the penal statute under which he is charged. 5
But this is not a favored interpretation since
ignorance or mistake of the penal law very rarely
is permitted as a defense.
The word wilfully may also mean intentionally
or recklessly, as opposed to inadvertently,5 es-
pecially if the crime is not one of moral turpitude.,
Given this interpretation, the further problem,
discussed later," is whether the intentionality
requirement extends only to defendant's actions or
whether it also extends to the other circumstances
and results that constitute the actus reus of the
offense. If the former alternative is chosen, the
word wilfully means no more than the defendant's
actions must have been voluntary; in other words,
it imposes no mes rea requirement at all.59 On the
other hand, in some contexts, especially where the
crime is one of moral turpitude, courts have
acknowledged that proof of a bad motive is
necessary. 60 This interpretation gives rise to the
administrative problems previously discussed.
Because of its currency, one further interpreta-
tion of the word wiful should be considered. In
prosecutions under certain gaming tax stamp and
0 See, e.g., Wright v. Commonwealth, 335 S.W.2d
930 (Ky. 1960); Morss v. Forbes, 24 N.J. 341, 132
A.2d 1 (1957); see generally Perkins, A Rationale of
Mens Rea, 52 HxAv. L. REv. 905, 915 (1939).
"Wumarws §30, at 72; see also Perkins, supra note
53, at 917; SinTH & HoOAN, GrmAL LAw 61-62(1965).
55 Morss v. Forbes, 24 N.J. 341, 132 A.2d 1, 22-23
(1957) (dissenting opinion).
66 WEr.Ams § 22.57Nabob Oil Co. v. United States, 190 F.2d 478
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 876 (1951); United
States v. Perplies, 165 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1948);
Fields v. United States, 164 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
11 See infra p. 10.
59 The requirement of voluntary action is usually
treated as part of the actus res rather than as a
mens rea requirement. This enables us to permit the
defense of "no voluntary act" to strict-liability offenses
without altering our definition of strict-liability crimes,
which (we are accustomed to saying) require no proof
of mental attitude. WmIa s §9.
60 United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 387 (1933);
Nabob Oil Co. v. United States, 190 F.2d 478 (10th
Cir.) cert. denied, 342 U.S. 876 (1951); see also ED-
wxns, supra note 51, at 31-32. The fullest statement
of the various meanings of wilful is found in Zimberg v.
United States, 142 F.2d 132, 137 (1st Cir. 1944),
citing important United States Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the word.
registration statutes, 61 the lower federal courts have
held that the defendant has not acted wilfully
unless he knew of the penal statute under which he
is charged and understood that it applied to the
gaming tax. The spectacle of prosecutors using
newspaper reports of former prosecutions to prove
that the defendant must have read about the
gaming tax laws and prosecutions brought for
their violationO demonstrates the wisdom of the
maxim which says that ignorance of the penal law
excuses no man. There is a significant difference
between allowing exculpation because a defendant
was ignorant of the nature of his conduct or of the
likelihood of a certain result and allowing exculpa-
tion because a defendant did not understand what
conduct a penal statute proscribes.U Where a penal
statute that is not void for vagueness is properly
promulgated,"0 it is rare, indeed, to see the latter
61 INT. Rxv. CODyE of 1954, §§4401, 4411,4412, & 7203.
2 See, e.g., United States v. Marquez, 332 F.2d
162 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 890 (1964);
Edwards v. United States, 334 F.2d 360 (5th Cir.
1964) (en banc), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1000 (1965);
United States v. Roy, 213 F. Supp. 479 (D. Del. 1963);
United States v. McGonigal, 214 F. Supp. 621 (D.
Del. 1963). These cases are outgrowths of United
States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 387 (1933), where the
Court held that a defendant who intentionally engaged
in conduct in violation of a statute could not have
acted wilfully if he reasonably, but erroneously,
believed that the statute was unconstitutional. The
district and circuit courts have concluded, not il-
logically, that if a defendant must have reason to
believe that a statute is constitutional before he can
wilfully violate it, he cannot wilfully violate it unless
he knows of its existence and understands its meaning.
63 See, e.g., United States v. Roy, 213 F. Supp. 479
(D. Del. 1963); United States v. McGonigal, 214 F.
Supp. 621 (D. Del. 1963).
0 It could be argued that the ignorance is of a civil
law and not a penal law since the gaming tax require-
ments are embodied in statutes separate from the
statute that imposes criminal penalties for non-
compliance. See United States v. Wilson, 214 F. Supp.
629 (D. Del. 1963). But the better view is that the
laws operate together as a penal stature that makes it
criminal, for instance, to wilfully engage in the business
of gaming without paying the fifty-dollar stamp tax.
The gaming case is different from income tax cases,
where there may be ignorance of any one of hundreds of
provisions used in calculating the tax owed. Necessary
fictions aside, the gaming provisions are primarily
penal laws; the income tax is primarily a civil law.
Higher mens rea requirements can be tolerated in the
income-tax cases since there are other means (civil
penalties) of achieving the main purpose of the tax
(collecting revenues).
65 The gaming tax statutes are as well promulgated
as other federal laws. Nor do the higher promulgation
standards of Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225
(1957), apply since gamblers are engaged in affirma-
tive conduct. See Reyes v. United States, 258 F.2d
774 (9th Cir. 1958).
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sort of defense succeed."8 The irony is that this un-
usually heavy inens rea requirement has been de-
duced from a word (wilfully) that often is in-
terpreted to require only that the defendant have
acted voluntarily, that is, from a word that often
imports no inens rea requirement at all.1
The Scope of Mental Attitude Requirements
Another problem is deciding which material
elements of an offense are governed by statutory
words like wilfully and knowingly. For example, a
statute forbids the wilful killing of a house pigeon,
and wilful is equated with intentional. Does the
intentionality requirement mean that the actor
must know he is killing a house pigeon and not a
wild bird, or is it enough that the killing be inten-
tional? Cotterill v. Penn's chose the latter alter-
native. On the other hand, a New York case 6 held
that the offense of knowingly permitting the opera-
tion of one's vehicle by an unlicensed driver
requires not only that the "permitting" be volun-
tary but also that the driver be known by the
defendant to be unlicensed. Similarly, a California
case applied the word wilfully to both the failure
of an employer to pay unemployment insurance
premiums and to the material element of "being
unable" to make the payments. 0 In other words,
the employer must have intentionally disabled
himself from making the payments, an interpreta-
tion that avoided constitutional difficulties. Ed-
wards perceptively observed that the rule of con-
6GThe federal courts are not alone in suggesting
that wilfulness requires knowledge and understanding
of the penal law. See, e.g., State v. Gotsch, 23 Conn.
Supp. 395, 184 A.2d 56, 58 (1962); Morss v. Forbes,
24 NJ. 341, 132 A.2d 1, 23 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
But usually when such a requirement is imposed, we
are dealing with something less than a full-fledge
criminal statute, as, for instance, a securities regu-
lation the violation of which is criminal. See, e.g., 15
U.S.C. §§78ff & 80a-48 (1964).67 See n. 59, supr p. 10. In Edwards v. United
States, 334 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1964) (en banc), cert.
dafed, 379 U.S. 1000 (1965), the court shifted the
burden to the defendant to prove his ignorance of the
gaming provisions. The dissent asserted that the cre-
ation of a so-called rebuttable presumption that the
defendant knew of the statutes effectively eliminated
the notion that wilfulness requires knowledge and
understanding of the particular penal statute. If this
be true, the majority has done a service for the criminal
law and has reached a result consistent with other re-
cent federal interpretations of wilful. See, e.g., United
States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934, 943 (6th Cir. 1963).
'[19351 All E.R. 204. Accord, Wells v. Hardy,
[19641 1 All E.R. 953.
6 People v. Shapiro, 4 N.Y.2d 597, 15 N.E.2d 65,
176 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1958).
70 People v. Neal C. Oester, Inc., 154 Cal. App.2d
888, 316 P.2d 784 (1957).
struction a judge employs in interpreting these
types of statutes reveals the importance that he
attaches to the mens rea requirement in criminal
law.'
Smith and Hogan criticize the Cotterill decision
and argue that words like wilfully and knozwngly
should be interpreted to govern all the material
elements unless the particular statute clearly
indicates otherwise," which is the position the
Model Penal Code adopts" and the rule of construc-
tion that Williams claims is generally employed. 4
Ideally the legislature would indicate in each
statute just what mental attitude governs each of
the material elements of the offense, as did one of
the writer's favorite English statutes, which made
it an offense to "wittingly and willingly receive,
relieve, comfort and maintain any Jesuit,...
knowing the same to be a Jesuit".7 5
ExCEPTIONS TO THE MENTAL
ATTTI DE REQUIREMENT
A strict liability offense permits conviction with-
out proof that the defendant had any particular
mental attitude toward one or more material
elements of the offense. The remainder of this essay
explores two areas where the criminal law dis-
penses with the mental attitude requirement.
Denial of the Defense of Reasonable Mistake
When proof of intentionality or recklessness is
required, any honest mistake which leaves the
defendant without knowledge or belief that a
material element exists or will result from his
conduct is an absolute defense.76 When negligence
is a sufficient mental attitude to support convic-
tion, for acquittal the mistake must be both honest
71 EWinwAs, supra note 51, at 31, 46.
72SmTH & HOGAN, CRMmNAL LAW 62 (1965).
7MODEL PENAL CODE §2.02 (1) (Proposed Official
Draft, 1962).4WrAms §61.
75 Jesuits Act of 1585, 27 Eliz. 1, c. 2, §4.76 For the most part, this essay is concerned with
substantive rules of law and not with the important
burden-of-proof issue. For example, when the words
defense and exculpate are used, the writer does not mean
to imply that the defendant necessarily has the burden
of proof. When mistake negates a required mental
element, the state, with its ultimate burden of proving
the existence of the mental element, should have the
ultimate burden of showing the non-existence of the
mistake. But whatpresumptions the state willbe allowed
and what sort of evidence defendant will have to
introduce to overcome those presumptions and to
require the state to introduce evidence to satisfy its
ultimate burden are questions left for another day.
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and reasonable.17 When a strict-liability offense is
charged, no mistake, however reasonable, will
exculpate. 8 Stated conversely, when an honest but
unreasonable mistake exculpates, the required
mental attitude is either intentionality or reckless-
ness. When only a reasonable mistake will suffice,
negligence is the required mental attitude. When
mistake, however reasonable, is denied as a defense,
a strict-liability offense is created. Furthermore,
whenever an affirmative defense would succeed if
the facts had been as defendant reasonably believed
them to be, and the defense is disallowed because
the facts were otherwise, the offense is one of
strict liability?9 In concrete terms, for instance,
the defendant in People v. Youngs° would have been
acquitted had he been attacking ruffians beating a
youth, rather than policemen engaged in lawful
activity, as he reasonably believed he was. By
disallowing the defense of reasonable mistake, the
New York Court of Appeals made third-degree
assault into a strict-liability offense.81 A treatment
7 Howard, The Reasonableness of Mistake in the
Criminal Law, 4 U. QUEENSLAND LJ. 45 (1961).
78The treatment of the defense of mistake as an
aspect of the mental attitude requirement is the ap-
proach of the Model Penal Code and of modem writers.
See MODEL PENAL CODE §2.04 (1)(a) (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962); see, e.g., SAuTH & HOGAIN, CRna-
NAL LAw 114 (1965). The only reason to make separate
code provisions dealing with mistake is to allow
exculpation even in those strict-liability situations
(where ordinarily the law dispenses with the mental-
attitude requirement) when we are especially moved
by the character of the mistake (for example, mis-
take induced by a high-court decision that is later
reversed). See MODEL PENAL CODE §2.04 (3)(b), com-
ment at 139 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). The author
does not emphasize these special situations lest he
detract from his theme that not the source of the mis-
take but rather its reasonableness should be important
in the criminal law.
79 This is because the elements of an offense-in their
broadest sense-include the absence of circumstances,
conduct, or results which, when accompanied by any
required mental attitude, would be a sufficient defense.
See MODEL PENAL CODE §1.13 (9) (Proposed Official
Draft, 1962).
80 11 N.Y.2d 274, 183 N.E.2d 319 (1962).
8163 CoL m. L. Rv. 160, 166 (1963). This decision
demonstrates that an affirmative defense sometimes
requires both the inverse of an actus reus (facts justify-
ing intervention) and an accompanying mental attitude
(knowledge or belief that those facts exist). If defendant
joined the melee for his own reasons, ignorant of facts
that would justify intervention, he must be convicted
even if those facts existed. See PEns.Ncs, CR11UAL LAw
723 (1957). Predominant motive is as irrelevant to an
affirmative defense as it is to a prima facie crime. A
defendant can escape punishment even were he slays
an old enemy with great delight so long as he knows
that facts exist which justify the defense of self or
others. Golden v. State, 25 Ga. 527 (1858), demon-
strates that commentators are wrong when they use
the defense-against-force situation as an illustration
of two areas where the defense of mistake is often
denied will show in detail the effects of dispensing
with the mental element in crime.
The Statutory Rape Cases
In America, statutory rape 2 is almost always a
strict-liability offense; convictions may be sus-
tained even against a showing that the defendant
reasonably believed that the girl was above the
age specified in the statute." A "legal-wrong"
theory and a "moral-wrong" theory have been
offered in support of strict liability in this area.
It is argued that when a defendant has inten-
tionally engaged in the crime of fornication, he
should be punished for the more serious crime of
statutory rape, regardless of his belief about the
girl's age, if in fact she was under the statutory
age. The intent to engage in conduct that consti-
tutes the material elements of fornication replaces
the intent to engage in the actus reus of a more
serious crime. This theory was used in the 1840
case of Commonwealth v. Elwell, '- where the court
told the defendant in an adultery trial that it was
unconcerned about his belief that the woman was
single because defendant had intentionally forni-
cated. In 1859 an Iowa court"5 applied the theory
in an offense-against-a-minor case. Later in Regina
of the importance of motive in the criminal law. See,
e.g., PEaxiNs, supra; Blum Motive, Intent, and Purpose
in Federal Income Taxation, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 485,
486--87,492-93 (1967).
82 "Statutory-rape offense" is the writer's shorthand
for criminal prohibitions aimed at protecting females
from sexual experience at an early age. The name of
the actual crime may be rape, aggravated rape, second-
degree rape, indecent liberties with a child, or con-
tributing to the delinquency of a minor. It may be a
misdemeanor, or it may be punishable by death. The
critical age may be ten, or it may be eighteen.
8Alaska and Hawaii are the latest jurisdictions to
so hold. See Hawaii v. Delos Santos, 42 Hawaii 102
(1957); Anderson v. State, 384 P.2d 669 (Alaska 1963).
A unanimous court in People v. Hernandez, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673 (1964), was the first in America
to allow as a defense a reasonable but mistaken belief
that the girl was above the statutory age, that is, to
make negligence as to age the minimum mental atti-
tude upon which criminality might be predicated, a
decision so startling that it took even defense counsel
by surprise. See People v. Moseley, 240 Cal. App. 2d
859, 50 Cal Rptr. 67 (1966). The burden-of-proof issue
under the new rule is as yet unsettled. See People v.
Winters, 242 Cal. App. 2d, 827, 51 Cal. Rptr. 735, 738(1966), and compare, People v. Battles, 240 Cal. App.
2d 122, 49 Cal. Rptr. 367, 368 (1966). The new Cali-
fornia rule has precedent in foreign statutes and case law.
See Myers, Reasonable Mistake of Age: A Needed De-fense to Statutory Rape, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 105, 106-07
(1966).
14 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 190 (1840).
85 State v. Ruh], 8 Iowa 447 (1859).
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v. Prince" the English court, in considering a
hypothetical, developed the rationale in the statu-
tory-rape situation, and its dictum has greatly
influenced the American courts even though Eng-
land swiftly rejected the decisionP7
The legal-wrong theory is just one examplesi of
society, outraged by a harm, punishing as a more
serious offense conduct that would be punished less
severely absent the substitution of intention to
engage in the less grave criminal conduct for the
intention to engage in the more serious criminal
conduct. It is the same justification used for
punishing as grand larceny the taking of property
which defendant reasonably believed was worth
less than the statutory minimum for grand lar-
ceny. The substitution of the intent to fornicate
for the intent to commit statutory rape is anal-
ogous to the substitution of intent in the felony-
murder rule, with the difference that the sub-
stituted intentionality is as to circumstances in the
fornication case and as to results in the felony
case.
The legal-wrong theory is unavailable in juris-
dictions where fornication is not a crime and
weakened where a fornication statute lies in
disuse s9 But where such a statute is enforced, the
argument cannot be ignored. The substitution of
the intention to engage in one criminal act for the
intention to engage in another may well be toler-
ated by a society that so often dispenses with proof
of any mental attitude at all.90 Since it is punished
more severely, statutory rape, by definition, is a
greater legal harm than fornication. Harm "pro-
vides a rational basis for punishment as well as for
the differentiation of punishments, i.e. in propor-
tion to the gravity of the harm." 9 Although we
may wish to punish the man who has intercourse
with a fifteen-year-old knowing she is fifteen more
severely than the man who believes she is over
sixteen since the first man has intentionality as to
the actus reus of the crime when sixteen is the
88 [1875] L.R. 2 C.C.R. 154, 13 Cox Crim. Cas. 138.
17 Myers, supra note 83, at 110.
88 See pp. 4-5 supra.89 Myers, supra note 83, at 127-28. But the argu-
ment is not entirely undermined since desuetude in
the criminal law is generally of little significance.
10 Such is the case in many bigamy prosecutions and
in public welfare offense prosecutions. See infra, p. 15.91HALL 221. But note that both Hall and Williams
would accept the defense of mistake in statutory rape
and would even prefer recklessness as the minimum
mental attitude for conviction. HAr. 374; Wnim~s
§69, at 196. This seemingly radical position is a neces-
sary one for anyone who claims that criminality should
not be predicated upon negligence.
critical age, we may also wish to punish the man
who has intercourse with the fifteen-year-old more
severely than the man who copulates with a six-
teen-year-old, regardless of what either thought
about age, since the first man has achieved the
greater legal harm. The principle of substituted
intent can no more be summarily rejected in the
statutory rape area than it can in the grand-
larceny hypothetical or in the application of the
felony-murder rule. The critical question is when,
if ever, should society increase its emphasis on
harm in meting out punishment, at the cost of
de-emphasizing the mental element in crime.2 A
strong argument has been made elsewhere that
statutory rape is not an appropriate place to employ
the principle of substituted intent.si
The "moral-wrong" theory allows the substitu-
tion of an intention to engage in conduct that is
immoral for the intention to engage in conduct
that is criminal. It is thus available even where
defendant's conduct would be legal, because of the
abolition of the crime of fornication, if the female
had been as old as defendant reasonably believed
she was. The moral-wrong rationale is as consistent
with a harm-oriented theory of retribution as is
the legal wrong theory. Furthermore, if deterrence
is the goal of our penal system, it is possible that
the legal harm sought to be prevented will occur
less frequently if men are told that they must act
at their peril rather than if they are told they must
be careful in ascertaining the female's age. In
jurisdictions were fornication is not a crime, some
legal conduct may also be deterred by a strict-
n Logically, the fairest place to use the principle of
substituted intention is where the intent to commit
a graver crime is substituted for the intent to commit a
lesser offense. But see supra p. 7 and note 24. It might
also be asked why the intent to fornicate should not
be substituted for the intent to commit forcible rape
(making irrelevant the defendant's reasonable mistaken
belief that the victim consented) as readily as it is
substituted for the intent to commit statutory rape.
But, at a minimum, negligence as to non-consent is
required for forcible rape. See notes I & 2, supra p. 5.
93 Myers, supra note 83. When states raise the critical
age to eighteen, still punish as a felony, and still use
doctrines borrowed from an era when ten years was
the critical age, they ignore the fact that young men
have been frequently seduced by seventeen-year-olds
but rarely by nine-year-olds. The Model Penal Code
denies the defense of reasonable mistake only when the
critical age is ten or under. MODEL PENAL CODE
§213.6(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). The chance
of defendant's proving that he reasonably believed
that the female he knew as a naughty lady was under
age are slim when she shows up in court with pigtails
and a ragdoll. See Reid v. State, 290 P.2d 775 (Old.
Cr. 1955); Myers, supra note 83, at 123 n. 118.
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liability standard. But there is no reason to lament,
as there might be when a no-scienter obscenity
statute inhibits exercise of First Amendment
rights. 4 If society no longer condemns pre-marital
sexual intercourse between mature persons,95 it has
not yet agreed that the state has a sacred duty to
promote free love as it does free speech.
On the other hand, the moral wrong theory
rests upon the assumption that society has reached
a consensus as to what is morally wrong, which is
untrue on the facts of Prince8 and untrue in cases
where any intimacy will bring criminal penalties
if the girl turns out to be under eighteen.w At
least the consensus is not so strong that the in-
dependent moral wrong upon which the theory
rests has been embodied in a penal statute binding
upon the entire adult population. The case law
on statutory vagueness also reminds us that the
consciousness of wrongdoing is not ordinarily a
sufficient warning to a person that he may suffer
criminal penalties. Finally, although the moral-
wrong theory was proposed by the very courts
that suggested the legal-wrong theory, unlike the
legal-wrong theory, it has few analogues in the
criminal law. The substitution of one criminal
intention for another is a familiar process; the
substitution of immoral intent for criminal intent
is rare.99
4See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959),
discussed infra, p. 2 2.
95 The drafters of the Model Penal Code, for reasons
known only to themselves, felt compelled to say that
the "(p)ursuit of females who appear to be over 16
betokens no abnormality but only a defiance of religious
and social conventions which appear to be fairly widely
disregarded." MODEL PENAL CODE §207.4, comment
at 253 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
96The crime charged was taking an unmarried girl
under sixteen out of her father's possession without
his consent.
9Even Illinois makes the misdemeanor of con-
tributing to the sexual delinquency of a minor a strict-
liability offense as to age, although the critical age is
eighteen and the conduct proscribed is, in effect, any
sexual intimacy. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §11-5 (1965).
This is part of a compromise that makes a reasonable
mistake as to age a defense to a felony for which the
critical age is sixteen. ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 38, §11-4(1965).
9s Bvt c.f. United States v. National Dairy Prod-
ucts Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963).
99 But there can be little objection to using either
theory to allow for the substitution as to a necessary
element of the offense that is jurisdictional and un-
related to the harm. For example, the intent to engage
in immoral conduct should suffice even though the
defendant reasonably belived he had not crossed a
state line with the woman. The Model Penal Code
achieves the same result more directly by excludingjurisdictional factors from its definition of "material
element" and by requiring proof of mental attitude
The Bigamy Cases
A material element of bigamy"90 is a pre-existing
valid marriage of one of the parties. A defendant
may have known of this marriage, or he may have
been reckless or negligent as to its existence. He
may also have been ignorant of its existence
through no fault of his own. Negligence as to this
material element is almost always a sufficient
mental attitude to support conviction. Moreover,
bigamy is often a strict-liability offense, that is the
state need not prove that the material element of
i pre-existing marriage was accompanied by any
mental attitude.
A mistake of fact may explain defendant's
ignorance of the existence of this material element.
For example, he erroneously believed that his
first wife was dead or that she had secured a
divorce decree. Or he may have married a woman
who, unknown to him, had a lawful husband living
in some other state. For some unknown reason,
reasonable mistake of fact is most likely to be
accepted as a defense in the last case and least
likely to be accepted when defendant claims he
believed a decree existed.
The early cases denying the defense of reasonable
belief of death reasoned that since the legislature
expressly permitted one spouse without fear of
criminal penalties to remarry after seven years'
unexplained absence of the other spouse, it must
have intended that remarriage before that period
be at the peril of the remarrying spouse.0 The
leading English case, Regina v. Tolson,"'0 rejected
this statutory construction, and some American
only as to elements of the offense that are "material."
MODEL PENAL CODE §§1.13 (10), 2.02 (1) (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962). It may be difficult to determine
what is merely jurisdictional and what is truly related
to the degree of harm. The issue of whether a defendant
accused of assaulting a federal officer must know that
his victim is a federal officer is still unsettled. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bell, 219 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. N.Y.
1963), and compare United States v. Wallace, 368
F.2d 537 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 976
(1967). Perhaps the federal element is jurisdictional
and the officer element related to the gravity of the
offense. In the latter case, there remains the problem of
whether the intent to assault an ordinary citizen can
replace the intent to assault an officer engaged in his
official duties.
10oThe word bigamy is used to include bigamous
marriage, bigamous cohabitation, and marrying a
bigamist.
101 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mash, 48 Mass.(7 Met.) 472 (1844); State v. Ackerly, 79 Vt. 69,
64 A. 450 (1906).
1n [1889] 23 Q.B.D. 168, 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 629,
[1886-1890] All E.R. 26.
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courts have followed Tolson by making negligence
the minimum mental attitude for conviction.1"
An 1899 American case'4 used decisions holding
that mistaken belief of death was no defense as
precedents for rejecting as a defense the mistaken
belief of the existence of a divorce decree. A poorly
educated defendant, who appeared to be the
victim of fraudulent representations to the effect
that a decree had been secured for him, was
sentenced to three years in prison after the defense
of reasonable belief was rejected as a matter of law.
In 1908 Illinois sent a defendant to jail for five
years over his protestations that he could prove
that he reasonably believed that his first wife had
divorced him. 05 In 1921 an English court ruled
that such a defense was inadmissible and said that
Tolson applied only in the mistake-of-death cases l°0
In 1926 a Utah court acknowledged that there was
"no evidence whatever of bad faith" in defendant's
belief that a decree existed--and then affirmed
his polygamy conviction.' 7 As late as 1962 a
Maryland court, with little attempt at analysis,
rejected the defense of reasonable belief in the
existence of a divorce decree."' But some states do
permit such a defense' 09
On the other hand, few states punish criminally
the man who married ignorant as to the existence of
his wife's lawful husband residing elsewhere.' 0 One
suggested reason is that legislatures do not intend
103 See, e.g., Dotson v. State, 62 Ala. 141 (1878);
Welch v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. R. 528, 81 S.W. 50 (1904).
104 Russell v. State, 66 Ark, 185, 489 S.W. 821
(1899).
105 People v. Spoor, 235 Ill. 230, 85 N.E. 207 (1908).
The rule has been reversed in Illinois by statute.
Reasonable mistake is now a defense. IL. REv. STAT.
ch. 38, §11-12 (1965).
16 Rex v. Wheat, [1921] 2 K.B. 119, 15 Cr. App. R.
134.
"7 State v. Hendrickson, 67 Utah 15, 245 P. 375
(1926).
10 Braun v. State, 230 Md. 82, 185 A.2d 905 (1962).
"The Court of Appeals, called upon to face an old
problem, produced the old answer. It affords an ex-
cellent example of what Dean Pound called mechanicaljurisprudence." Hogan, Mens Rea in Bigamy in Mary-
land: An Obituary?, 23 vID. L. REv. 224, 232 (1963).
1I See, e.g., People v. Vogel, 46 Cal.2d 798, 299
P.2d 850 (1956); Adams v. State, 110 Tex. Cr. R. 20,
7 S.W.2d 528 (1928); Baker v. State, 86 Neb. 775,
126 N.W. 300 (1910).
0 As of twelve years ago, every state statute, except
one, that made marrying a bigamist an offense made
knowledge a required mental attitude. MODEL PENAL
CODE §207.2, comment at 225 n.60 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955). The reader is not told whether any state courts
read the word "knowingly" out of the statute by
saying that defendant must know that he is getting
married, not that he is marrying a bigamist.
to send to jail the victims of fraud.m But belief
in the death of a first spouse or in the existence of
a divorce decree may also be induced by fraudulent
misrepresentations.
Strict liability in these cases is indefensible,
whatever be the nature of the underlying mistake
of fact. Defendants would not have been engaged
in any legal or moral wrong had the facts been as
they reasonably believed them to be; hence the
principle of substituted intent is unavailable.
Penalties for blameless defendants may be heavy,
but they are unlikely to deter people who reason-
ably believe that they are free to marry, so that it
makes little sense to say that the stability of the
family depends upon a strict-liability standard. 12
Even if such a standard would prevent more
bigamous marriages than would a negligence stand-
ard, any in terrorem effect would also deter people
whose marriages would not be bigamous from
marrying because they lacked absolute certainty
that the first spouse was dead or that a decree
existed. This would be a significant deprivation of
an important human right. Nor is there proof that
juries would be deceived frequently by false claims
of reasonable mistake of fact.
Whether a prior valid marriage was in force at
the time of the allegedly bigamous marriage is a
material fact that may also depend upon the
resolution of a question of civil law, for example,
the validity of an existing divorce decree, which
may, in turn, depend upon the law of domicile (the
basic jurisdictional requirement). Because of the
hoary maxims,"3 "Ignorance of the law excuses no
man," and "Everyone is presumed to know the
law," the defense of reasonable but mistaken belief
in the validity of a decree is almost always re-
jected-that is, bigamy is a strict liability offense
when defendant's mistake lies in the application of
the law of divorce to the facts of his case.
The typical trial sees the defendant arguing that
the decree is valid and, therefore, that the second
marriage is proper; or, in the alternative, that he
reasonably believed that the decree was valid. The
jury determines that, contrary to the finding of the
- See, e.g., State v. Audette, 81 Vt. 400, 70 A. 833
(1908).
" See, e.g., State v. Ackerly, 79 Vt. 69, 64 A. 450,
451 (1906).
"' In a famous essay written sixty years ago, Keedy
noted that the role of maxims in the law was dwindling.
Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law,
22 HARv. L. Rxv. 75 (1908). Apparently the decline
came too late to have much effect on the area of the
law now under consideration.
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judge issuing the decree, the defendant was not
domiciled in the state that granted the divorce. The
criminal court judge instructs the jury that reason-
able belief in the decree's validity is no defense.
The defendant is convicted and sentenced." 4 For
example, a soldier stationed in Florida told the
Florida divorce court the true facts about his
status in Florida and obtained an ex parte decree
from it. Two years later he remarried. In a crimi-
nal prosecution," 5 Pennsylvania alleged that the
second marriage was bigamous. The Pennsylvania
courts agreed that Florida had erred in its deter-
mination that the soldier had obtained a Florida
domicile. That decision made, it was held proper to
deem the soldier a criminal. Everyone is presumed
to know the law of domicile, even though the
Florida court, in the view of the Pennsylvania
courts, had some trouble mastering it.
Similar problems arise when foreign decrees are
relied upon. The criminal court must first decide
whether the decree is to be given comity; and, if
not, it will rule that reasonable belief that the
decree would be given comity is no defense." 6 Or a
defendant may marry in the good faith belief that
his first marriage was a nullity for nonage and then
have a jail term in which to ponder the distinction
between void and voidable, his reasonable mistake
of law having served as no defense. In one case the
defendant made a solid argument that he reason-
ably believed that the purportedly bigamous mar-
riage was itself voidable because of duress used
against him; but he was, as a matter of law, de-
prived of the defense. 17
After a valid decree has been issued, a person
may have trouble in determining when he has the
right to remarry, not so much in those cases where
a decree does not become final for a period of
time,118 but more so when the decree orders him,
as the party at fault, not to remarry during the
life of his former spouse. The effect of such an
order, like the determination of a state's right to
grant a divorce to a soldier stationed within its
"4 See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 342 U.S. 226
(1945); State v. Woods, 107 Vt. 354, 179 A. 1 (1935);
cf. State v. Zichfeld, 23 Nev. 304, 46 P. 802 (1896).
" Commonwealth v. Ormando, 55 Pa. D. & C. 521(1946).
116 See, e.g., State v. De Meo, 20 N.J. 1, 118 A.2d 1
(1955).
11 Medrano v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 214, 22 S.W. 684
(1893).
118 See generally Stephens v. State, 73 Okl. Cr. 349,
121 P.2d 326 (1942); State v. Grengs, 253 Wis. 248,
33 N.W.2d 248 (1948).
borders,"9 involves complex questions in the
conflicts of laws."0 Nevertheless, defendant's re-
marriage in reliance on a judicial determination of
those issues may bring criminal penalties at some
future date in any state where he takes up resi-
dence.
Three judicial utterances in American law sup-
port the proposition that a reasonable but mis-
taken belief in the validity of a decree should be a
defense to bigamy charges: Long v. State,"' which
held valid such a defense, emphasizing defendant's
reliance upon the advice of counsel, and dissenting
opinions in Williams v. North Carolina" and State
v. De Meo.m The dissent in De Meo praised the
honesty and good faith of the defendant, who, in
applying for a marriage license, had volunteered
all the relevant information about his Mexican
decree. In Williams Mr. Justice Black, who could
object to the state's denial of the defense only if
he found constitutional infirmities, said that due
process is violated by a state that sends "people to
prison for lacking the clairvoyant gift of prophe-
sying when one judge or jury will upset the finding
of fact made by another." 12A The majority's re-
sponse was that often people must gamble upon
what a jury will decide.
Criminality should not turn upon the mindless
adherence to a legal maxim. Since it is a function of
proscribed harm and of mental attitude, where the
proscribed harm is constant (a bigamous marriage),
criminality ordinarily should depend upon the
mental attitude (intentionality, recklessness, or
negligence) and not upon what accounts for that
attitude (bad motive, mistake of fact, or mistake
of law). The remarks made about the indefensi-
bility of making bigamy a strict-liability offense in
the case of mistake of fact are, therefore, fully
applicable in the case of mistake of civil law. The
average citizen may be in a better position to
discover whether his first spouse is dead than to
evaluate the validity of a divorce decree, especially
when he is not allowed to rely on a judicial opinion
or the advice of counsel. Finally, the discretion to
prosecute in mistake-of-law cases is much too
broad. With the states having acquiesced in the
"' See Wood v. Wood, 159 Tex. 350, 320 S.W.2d
807 (1959).
' See Beaudoin v. Beaudoin, 270 App. Div. 631,
62 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1946).
"'44 Del. 262, 65 A.2d 489 (1949).
"'342 U.S. 226 (1945).
"'20 N.J. 1, 118 A.2d 1, 8 (1955).
" 342 U.S. 226, 278.
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American system of Nevada and foreign divorces,
only political pressure prevents a prosecutor from
sending many leading citizens to jail merely by
proving that they did not really establish domicile
in obtaining their out-of-state decrees, while deny-
ing them the defense that they reasonably believed
that their decrees would be honored." 5
It is concluded that in all the bigamy cases not
the source of the error but its reasonableness should
determine whether the defense of mistake should
be honored. Negligence should be the minimum
criminal attitude upon which a bigamy conviction
can be sustained. This is basically the approach of
the Model Penal Code."6 It is an approach that
might be used profitably in all cases where the
defendant was non-negligently ignorant of the
existence of any element of an offense that is more
than merely jurisdictional. It is an approach that
would require acquittal in all such cases where the
principle of substituted intent is unavailable to
save the day for the prosecution.
Strict-Liability Public Welfare Offenses
Legal historians generally agree that prior to
the Twelfth Century the criminal law often held a
man liable for the harms he caused without proof
of his mental attitude.27 A few experts dissent,127
however, and it may be that our knowledge of that
early period is too scanty to support any generaliza-
tion.12 9 At any rate, proof of a blameworthy mind" 0
eventually became necessary for conviction, a
15 For instance, how many citizens could have been
sent to jail if the New York courts had rejected Mexican
decrees and then held that reasonable belief in their
validity was no excuse? Dr. Williams has argued that
the determination of close questions of civil law in a
criminal trial (as in Williams v. North Carolina) is an
abuse of the criminal process. Wzra.ms §116, at 341.
26 MODEL PENAL CODE §230. 1 (Proposed Official
Draft, 1962). Under the code reasonable mistake always
exculpates and even an honest unreasonable mistake
as to the death of the first spouse suffices for acquittal.
m SSIImT & HOGAN, CaNAL. LAw 35 (1965);
Remington & Helstad, The Mental Element in Crim--
A Legislative Problem, 1952 Wis L. R1v. 644, 648.
= HArT 78; Mueller, Tort, Crime and the Primitive,
46 J. CRm. L., C. & P.S. 303 (1955).
2 Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 Hav.L. REv. 974,976 (1932).10 The word blameworthy and the word fault are used
here without any implication that some ultimate blame-
worthiness was required beyond the usual criminal
mental attitudes toward the material elements of the
offense. Some historians may use such words to suggest
true blameworthiness. But nothing turns on the dis-
tinction since public welfare offenses, in dispensing
with the mental attitude requirement, a fortioridispense with proof of a blameworthy mental attitude,
which Canon Law emphasized.
phenomenon attributed to the influence of the
Roman Law and Canon Law."' The mental-
attitude requirement became so embedded in the
criminal law that modem historians have des-
ignated the 1846 case of Regina v. Woodrow"' as
the first to approve a conviction of a new type of
crime, the strict-liability public welfare offense."'
In Woodrow the possibility that some blameless
dealer might be convicted of possessing adulterated
tobacco was weighed against the "public incon-
venience" of an inadequatedly regulated tobacco
industry. The court decided that the difficulty of
proving intentionality, recklessness, or negligence
as to the material element of adulteration, together
with the need for safeguarding the public, justified
relieving the Crown of the burden of proving any
culpable mental attitude."4
The use of the offense spread. For instance, in
1896 Holmes decided that a defendant could be
convicted of presence in the place of gaming
instruments without proof that he knew of their
existence." 5 In 1899 the classic among adulterated
food cases was decided." 6 Milk had been pure when
it left the defendant's hands, but it was watered
by another party while in transit and out of his
control. Defendant was deemed guilty of an adul-
terated sale because title had not passed to the
buyer until after the adulteration had taken place.
The early Twentieth Century, with its greater
concern for public health and safety, witnessed an
even wider use of strict-liability public welfare
offenses."" A survey of the old Wisconsin criminal
code revealed that over one half of the criminal
statutes in that state in the early Fifties were
susceptible of strict-liability interpretation (al-
though some were not of the public-welfare vari-
ety)."' But judges, despite their talk of legislative
"' StraT & HOGAN, CRnnzwn LAW 35 (1965).
1- [1846] M. & W. 404, 153 E.R. 907.
"'This crime is also called mialum prohibitun of-fense, quasi-crime, civil offense, and crime of absolute
liability.
134 The same need for regulation is said to justify
denying a defendant an opportunity to exculpate
himself by assuming the burden of proving that he acted
with all due care. See infra p. 20.
"5 Commonwealth v. Smith, 166 Mass. 370, 44 N.E.
503 (1896).
'Is Parker v. Alder, [1899] 1 Q.B. 20, 19 Cox Crim.
Cas. 191.
1" Sayre, Publia Welfare Offenses, 33 CoLua. L.
REv. 55, 67 (1933).
I'sRemington, Liability Without Fault Criminal
Statutes-Their Relationship to Major Developments inContemporary Exonomic and Social Policy: The Situ-
ation in Wisconsin, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 625, 627.
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intent, have been primarily responsible for the
proliferation of convictions without proof of mental
attitude in this area. 9 The Wisconsin study re-
vealed that not one of the eleven-hundred criminal
statutes contained an explicit rejection of the
mental attitude requirement.140
Food, narcotic, and traffic codes generate a
great portion of the strict-liability criminal litiga-
tion.14' The mental attitude requirement is dis-
pensed with most frequently in possession, sale, and
transportation of liquor offenses.'42 Typical is the
sale to a minor who has cleverly falsified his age.
Sale of liquor to a sober-appearing drunk also
merits criminal penalties. 42 In neither case is the
defendant allowed to exculpate himself by proving
that he used all due care in concluding that he was
serving a sober adult. Nor can one charged with
the unlawful possession of liquor win acquittal by
showing that he was ignorant of the true nature of
the liquid.?" Perhaps few juries would accept a
claim of reasonable mistake in these cases, but the
law denies the defendant even a chance to convince
them in those few cases where everyone would
agree the mistake was reasonable.
Two truck-driver cases show that the truly
blameless are sometimes deemed criminal under the
strict liability approach. In Commonwealth v.
Mixer 5 a driver for a common carrier was charged
with transportion of liquor without a permit. A
consignor had violated his statutory duty of
marking a barrel to indicate its alcoholic contents.
W39 Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, in 1962
SuPRzaEc COuRT REvraw (Kurland ed.) 107, 147.
See also Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 MINN.
L. REv. 1043, 1104 (1958).
140 Remington, supra note 138, at 630.
41 Sayre's enumeration of the various types of public
welfare offenses remains a useful categorization and an
abundant source of early cases. Sayre, supra note 137,
at 84-88. See also MODEL PENAL CODE §2.05, comment
at 141-45 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). In their more
unusual variety, strict-liability offenses include the
types of crimes Dean Allen refers to when he says,
"The killing of domesticated pigeons, the fencing of
saltpeter caves against wandering cattle,... and the
issue of daylight savings versus standard time have all
at one place or another been made problems of the
criminal law." Allen, Book Review, 66 YALE LJ.
1120, 1121 (1957).
W This is true even though liquor is an area that
readily lends itself to administrative control through
licensing.
141 State v. Morello, 169 Ohio St. 213, 158 N.E.2d
525 (1959). The earliest dictum in the American cases
approving strict liability suggested that mistake would
be no defense to the offense of selling liquor to a com-
mon drunkard. Barnes v. State, 19 Conn. 397 (1849).
14 State v. Whitman, 52 S.D. 91, 216 N.W. 858(1927).
16 207 Mass. 141, 93 N.E. 249 (1910).
The court acknowledged that there "was nothing
about the appearance of the barrel to cause
suspicion as to its contents." Defendant was
deemed a criminal once the contents were proved,
no mental attitude requirement being present.148
In Comtonwealth v. Olskefski'4 the driver possessed
a certificate issued by a licensed official, who had
weighed his truck out of his presence and before he
had driven it anywhere. The certificate indicated
his load was in compliance with legal limits. Never-
theless, a second weighing indicated that the first
had been in error. Defendant was convicted and
the lower court's decision affirmed.
Public welfare needs are also said to justify strict
criminal liability in the regulation of securities.' s
The defendant in People v. McCalla'" was charged
with "knowingly" selling securities without a
permit. In Cotterill v. Penn fashion1 ' the court
effectively read knowingly out of the statute
by holding that it did not govern the word
securities. Defendant was not allowed to raise the
defense of reasonable belief (founded on the advice
of counsel or otherwise) that the item in question
was not a security. His was a mistake of law, and
everyone is presumed to know the meaning of the
Blue Sky laws. State v. Dorby'0 held that civil
liability for innocent misrepresentations in regis-
tration statements must be supplemented by strict
criminal liability if Blue Sky policies are to be
implemented effectively. 52
In Noble v. State', another prosecutor attempted
to make perjury a strict-liability offense. The state
of Indiana, for a fee, supplied notaries at vehicle-
licensing branches to make the necessary verifica-
tion that the applicant had appeared personally
and had sworn that the signature on the applica-
tion was his. Circumstances were such that the
notaries usually did not know the applicants
personally and could easily be deceived as to who
actually appeared. Itself responsible for the system,
141 Contra, State v. Williams, 94 Ohio App. 249, 115
N.E.2d 36 (1952).
'47 64 Pa. D. & C. 343 (1948).
14 The word wilful is generally used in the federal
securities statutes, but the criminal prosecutions have
been too few to support any generalization about its
interpretation in a criminal context. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.
§§77x, 77yyy, 78ff, 80a-48, & 80b-17 (1964). On the
civil side, words importing intentionality are usually
construed to require nothing more than actions that
were voluntary.
4 63 Cal. App. 783, 220 P. 436 (1923).
150 See supra, p. 11.
1 217 Iowa 858, 250 N.W. 702 (1933).
1&2 But see State v. Smith, 151 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1963).
Ms 223 N.E. 755 (Ind. 1967).
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the state earnestly contended that a notary could
be convicted upon proof that she swore that an
applicant (whose signature was genuine) had ap-
peared before her when in fact she had not. The
trial court disallowed the defense that the de-
fendant used all due care in ascertaining the true
identity of applicants. She was convicted and
sentenced to one-to-three years in prison. The
higher court reversed in an opinon more important
for its result than for the line which is uses to
separate mental attitude offenses from strict lia-
bility crimes. T"
Perjury convictions, even when they arise in a
securities or taxation or licensing context, are
different from ordinary public welfare strict-lia-
bility convictions in that they sound of the common
law and traditionally bring moral stigma. This
raises the Morissettei5' issue: should common law
roots and stigma upon conviction make us less
willing to construe a statute as dispensing with a
mental attitude requirement? Recently the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin answered in the affirma-
tive when it refused to make bribery a strict-lia-
bility crime.' On the other hand, a Connecticut
court dispensed with the mental element in
criminal trespass in State v. McDermott.' The
statute there required proof that defendant was on
another's property without right. But a reasonable,
good-faith belief that federal and state labor laws
gave the defendant union official such a right in
the particular case was held to be no defense. Once
154The court said that malum prolibitum offenses
require proof of scienter while inaturn in se offenses do
not-the very opposite of what most courts have said.
The court reasoned that if defendant's knowledge that
he is engaging in an immoral activity in statutory rape
cases is a sufficient warning that he is acting at his
peril, the converse must be true: where the activity is
not immoral in itself, proof of a criminal mental
attitude is required. The rationale is at odds with every
case that permits public welfare convictions without
proof of a mental attitude. It will be interesting to
follow the future of public welfare offenses in Indiana.
In using the strict liability tool inappropriately, theprosecutor forced the high court to write an opinion
which, unless distinguished away, has effectively under-
mined strict-liability public welfare offenses in Indiana.
See also State v. Krug, 96 Ariz. 225, 393 P.2d 916(1964), where another court refused to make perjury
a strict-liability offense.11 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
In this case defendant claimed he had taken govern-
ment property under the belief that it had been aban-
doned. The Supreme Court held that since the statutory
offense was related to the law of theft, a criminal
mental attitude requirement should be read into the
statute.
156 State v. Alfonsi, 33 Wis.2d 469, 147 N.W.2d 550
(1967).
117 3 Conn. Cir. 524, 220 A.2d 38 (1965).
more the hoary maxim was available to resolve the
issue: every man is presumed to know the law.
State v. Lindberg,' if not sounding of the common
law, concerned an offense that carried the pos-
sibility of serious stigma. The heart of the crime
was borrowing from a bank in which defendant
held a directorship, but it was no defense that the
defendant reasonably believed that the source of
the remitted funds was another bank.159
Some writers insist that vicarious liability is
fundamentally different from strict liability. 10
Since, however, both impose criminal sanctions
without proof of fault, cases that permit conviction
of a non-negligent employer for the acts of his
employees may be considered along with other
strict-liability public welfare offenses and dis-
tinguished from mental attitude crimes. The Su-
preme Court in United States v. Dotterweich'" saw
no distinction, and the English court in Parker v.
Alder ' very consciously cited vicarious liability
cases as precedent for imposing personal strict
liability.
As recently as 1964, a partner in an Iowa auto-
mobile agency was held criminally liable for "per-
mitting" a buyer to use pasteboard plates without
first applying for title and registration.' m While the
partner was absent from the country, an employee
had sold the car in violation of the partner's ex-
plicit order. The court refused to read into the
statutory word permit a barrier against vicarious
liability, as dictum in a recent English case sug-
gested is proper.1"
Some courts do draw a line, however, between
vicarious liability and other forms of strict liability
without offering a justification for the distinc-
tion. 65 The Pennsylvania high court in Common-
18 125 Wash. 51, 215 P. 41 (1923).159 The defendant would probably have had diffi-
culty in convincing a jury that had just concluded that
the money had come from his bank that he reasonably
believed he was borrowing from another. But all he
asked was the chance, and it was denied him.
160 Packer, supra note 139, at 118; Comment, 38
J. Cm. L, C. & P.S. 132, 134-35 (1947).161320 U.S. 277 (1943).
1- [1899] 1 Q.B. 20, 19 Cox Crim. Cas. 191.
163 State v. Barry, 255 Iowa 1315, 125 N.E.2d 833
(1964).
164 Yeandel v. Fisher, [1965] 3 All E.R. 158.
165 The holding in America's first strict-liability case
was that although strict liability might be imposed
upon an employee for selling liquor to a common
drunkard, the employer should be acquitted if he
sincerely ordered the employee not to serve common
drunkards, a defense that apparently failed on remand.
Barnes v. State, 19 Conn. 397 (1849), conviction afrined
after retrial, 20 Conn. 232 (1850).
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wealth v. Koczwara1 66 held that a non-negligent
employer may be fined but not imprisoned for the
acts of his employees. Commonwealth v. Kempisty'1
forbade even fines for the employer except where
the crime charged was a violation of a regulatory
code. Finally, Comnwnwealth v. Morakis'1 limited
the use of vicarious liability in Pennsylvania to
liquor-code violations. Someday a Pennsylvania
court may hold that there is no sound basis for
distinguishing among the various types of strict-
liability public welfare offenses. It may use as
precedent the vicarious liable cases, which reflect a
distaste for strict liability in general, to support
the proposition that no man may be convicted of a
public welfare offense without proof of a criminal
mental attitude. In doing so, such a court would
abolish the anomaly of sending a non-negligent
employee to jail while merely fining (and that
only in liquor cases) his non-negligent employer.
Such speculation leads into a discussion of the
policy arguments over strict-liability offenses.
16 9 It
is contended that certain important industries
could not be regulated effectively without a strict-
liability standard; that, for example, the govern-
ment's burden of proof in food and drug cases was
impossible before United States v. Dotterweich170
held that not even negligence need be proved under
the federal act.m The usual retort is that convic-
tion rates could be increased in any area by easing
the government's burden of proof. It is further
replied that the expedience argument can not
justify denying a defendant the chance to exculpate
himself by showing, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that he acted with all due care. The
proponents answer that a jury could be deceived
easily into believing erroneously that a higher
degree of care was impossible. But the possibility of
deceiving a jury is an inadequate reason for deny-
ing the use of an otherwise proper defense in a
criminal case.
It is also argued that a strict-liability standard
has a more potent deterrent effect than does a
166 397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825 (1959).
167 191 Pa. Super. 602, 159 A.2d 541 (1960).
168 208 Pa. Super. 180, 220 A.2d 900 (1966).
169 Except for the judges who make the law, pro-
ponents of strict-liability public welfare offenses are
rare. The arguments advanced for strict liability are
often little more than propositions suggested, then
quickly rejected, by the opponents. But see Wasserstrom,
Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REv.
731 (1960); Rissman, Criminal Intent Under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 7 FOOD DRUG Cosm. L.J.
498 (1952).
170 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
171 Rissman, supra note 169, at 502.
negligence standard. Deterrence is not a perfectly
logical phenomenon. Tell a man he will go to jail
whenever he violates the letter of the law, and he
may be more careful than if you had told him that
he would go to jail absent a showing that he used
all due care. This argument assumes that the
threat of criminal penalties more adequately deters
undesirable conduct than does the possibility of
tort liability and civil or administrative penalties.
It also assumes that it is just to punish some non-
negligent defendants as a means of raising the
general population's standard of care.
The advocates for strict-liability public welfare
crimes say that their opponents exaggerate the
significance of these offenses. They contend that
criminal statutes are rarely invoked against blame-
less defendants who have made a real effort to
conform;lu2 and they note that harsh penalties are
occasionally a possibility, but that mistake or
faultless conduct has always been a grounds for
mitigation where it has not sufficed to acquit. For
instance, the penalty imposed in Morissette was a
two-hundred dollar fine although the statute would
have permitted a ten-year prison sentence. If viola-
tion of a welfare statute ever brought harsh manda-
tory penalties, Noble v. Stateln suggests that a
court would find some means to take the offense out
of the strict-liability category. If nothing else, it
might hold that where penalties are severe, the
legislative intent to dispense with a mental attitude
requirement must be manifested clearly; or such
a court might even reach the constitutional is-
sue.
It is unreasonable to say that a bad law should be
preserved because its sting is rarely felt, but the
minimal-harm argument should not be treated
lightly. It has forced the opposition to maintain
that even a small criminal penalty without proof
of fault may be harsh because of the stigma it
brings."4 In traffic offenses, this may not be true,
but in other instances the hardships that strict-
liability criminal convictions bring will vary with
the circumstances.175 The Model Penal Code an-
172 Remington, supra note 138, at 628.
M 223 N.E.2d 755 (Ind. 1967) See supra p. 18.
17 Another possibility is that a strict-liability offense,
with only a small penalty of its own, may function as
the misdemeanor in an application of the misdemeanor-
manslaughter rule, but that is a possibility that could
be curtailed without eliminating the strict-liability
offense itself. See People v. Stuart, 47 Cal.2d 167, 302
P.2d 5 (1956), and compare State v. Kotapish, 171
Ohio St. 349, 171 N.E.2d 505 (1960).
175 Edwards suggests that a criminal conviction
may be disastrous to a shopkeeper or a "chemist" be-
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nounces that strict-liability convictions shall not
bring disability or legal hardships,.75 but this goal
cannot be obtained by the fiat of an obscure pro-
vision in a criminal code. Nevertheless, designating
strict-liability offenses as non-criminal "viola-
tions" 7 might be helpful.
Opponents of strict liability have suggested that
more than the name be changed, that adminis-
trative and civil remedies replace the criminal
lawm as a tool of regulation:
The trial of reputable persons in a criminal
court would be discontinued. Instead, sound
legislation, inspection, licensing, information,
investigation by boards, informal conferences,
and publicity would provide likely means of
influencing legitimate business. 7 9
The proponents of strict liability argue, however,
that non-criminal remedies have proved ineffec-
tive, at least in some industries."' As Hall acknowl-
edges, 81 this is a debate that cannot be resolved
until more information is gathered for each par-
ticular industry.
The opponents also speculate that the "associa-
ation of criminality with complete moral inno-
cence" may be "an obstacle to the accomplishment
of the important general purposes of a system of
criminal justice". 8 ' The suggestion is rightfully
tentative because it rests upon the untested as-
sumption that criminal justice is a single ocean,
and that what happens in the tidewaters will have
profound effects on the high seas. More concrete
is the possibility that prosecutors, with convictions
so easily attainable under a strict-liability stand-
dard, will abuse their broad discretionary powers.
Commonwealth v. Morakism shows how a totally
cause his reputation will be destroyed. EnwARDs,
supra note 51, at 245 (1955). But this would be equally
true if word of administrative or civil sanctions spread.
The problem here is with strict liability of any sort,
which is not our concern when we are weighing the
criminal sort against other sorts of strict liability.
276 MODEL PENAL CODE §§1.04 (5), 2.05 (2)(a) (Pro-
posed Official Draft, 1962).
177 MODEL PENAL CODE §1.04 (5) (Proposed Official
Draft, 1962).
One of the great tasks of the law is to "identify
those particular areas that justice and expediency
dictate should be the province of the criminal law"
and to use other remedies where they are more fitting.
Allen, Criminal Law, 31 U. Cnr. L. REv. 257, 261
(1964).
'7' RAr 352.
180 Rissman, supra note 169, at 506.1 HA 359 n. 95.
m Allen, supra note 141, at 1123.
183191 Pa. Super 602, 159 A.2d 541 (1960). See
supra p. 20.
innocent employer may be prosecuted as a scape-
goat when the public is aroused by the unfortunate
death of a young man. In State v. NobW8 there is
an indication that the decision to prosecute would
not have been made absent the discovery of ir-
regularities in the state licensing and personal
property tax-collection systems in Indiana, ir-
regularities which the prosecutor apparently did
not attempt in the perjury trial to link to the de-
fendant."' When a conviction is wanted, too bad
if the defendant be blameless. Justice Black's
tale--told in a related context"--of an earlier day
when rulers made compliance with the law impos-
sible so as to be able to invoke the criminal process
against their enemies is not entirely inapposite.
CONSTiTUTioNAL LmI=ATIONs ON ThE
ELIMINATION OF TrE MENTAL ATTITUDE
REQUIREMENT
Constitutional attacks upon strict-liability have
been confined to its use in public welfare offenses.
Since no court would strike down the principle of
substituted intent, the denial of the defense of
mistake in the statutory-rape cases is immune
from constitutional attack. However, strict liabil-
ity in the bigamy cases, where heavy penalties are
sometimes imposed, should receive constitutional
considerations as much as strict liability in public
welfare offenses. In both cases, wholly blameless
persons may be deemed criminal. Unfortunately,
however, the denial of the defense of mistake in
the bigamy cases, even where harsh penalties have
been inflicted, is so well established in America
that a court might hesitate to maintain that such
a denial violates traditional notions of ordered
liberty.
The development of the relationship between
strict liability and due process has been primitive
to date.lu The United States Supreme Court has
184 223 N.E.2d 755 (Ind. 1967). See supra p. 18.
"
5 As usual, the appellate report may tell only half
the story. What is important is that defendants in these
cases could be truly blameless and still be deemed
criminal where the prosecutor has available the strict-
liability tool.
116 Williams v, North Carolina, 342 U.S. 226, 278
(1945) (dissenting opinion).
187 Professor Packer has blamed the state of affairs
on the Supreme Court. He paraphrased its utterances:
"Mens rea is an important requirement, but it is not a
constitutional requirement, except sometimes." Packer,
supra note 139, at 107-08. But, in fact, the Supreme
Court's present position on the constitutional question
is more certain than Packer's. For this reason he was
unable to provide any useful guidelines for determining
when strict-liability offenses are unconstitutional, guide-
lines which he claimed are desperately needed.
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implicitly acknowledged that even harsh penalties
may be imposed without proof of any mental atti-
tude,m even though it prefers a principle of stat-
utory construction that would eliminate strict
liability in many of these cases. 9 It has also said
(in Smith v. California9 0) that the mental attitude
requirement may not be dispensed with when to
do so would, by intimidating people from engaging
in a lawful activity, impinge upon the exercise of
a specially protected constitutional right, such as
free speech. In sum, unless we have before us a
law comparable to the no-scienter obscenity
statute of Smith, nothing that the Supreme Court
has yet said would make our strict-liability statute
unconstitutional. This means that no statute (and
no judicial gloss) discussed in this essay would
transgress constitutional limitations thus far
articulated by the Supreme Court.
Since the Smith doctrine is of limited applicabil-
ity, constitutional law must follow another path
if it is to develop in this area.' 9' The abuse of police
power is a rationale that should not be over-
looked.'" There comes a time when the legislative
approach to a public welfare problem is so irra-
tional, makes criminals out of so many innocent
people, restricts a legitimate business so severely,
that state courts have been willing to label a
statute a violation of due process. For example,
criminal liability for innocent purchasers of stolen
goods has been declared unconstitutional at least
twice.19 Another case strongly suggests that due
process may be offended when the mental-attitude
requirement is eliminated in criminal securities
provisions.1' 4 Still another held that a state legisla-
ture in eliminating scienter from an embezzlement
statute abused its police powers. 195 However, this
approach is too sporadic. The United States Su-
preme Court is no longer in the business of striking
down state laws on abuse-of-police-power grounds
on a statute-by-statute basis.
For this reason and others, it has been suggested
"'United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922);
United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922).
189 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
190 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
191 A decade of Supreme Court silence indicates
that development of the constitutional issues is not
inevitable.
192 See Laylin & Tuttle, Due Process and Punishment,
20 MICH. L. REv. 614 (1922).
19 People v. Estreich, 272 App. Div. 698, 75 N.Y.S.2d
267 (1947), af'd, 297 N.Y. 910, 79 N.E.2d 742 (1948);
Kilbourne v. State, 84 Ohio St. 247, 95 N.E. 824 (1911).
194 State v. Smith, 151 So.2d 889 (Florida 1963).
195 State v. Prince, 52 N.M. 15, 189 P.2d 993(1948).
that the Court should end strict liability in Amer-
ica with a single blow. Professor Mueller advances
this proposition:
Once it is recognized that the common law
created the doctrine of mens rea as a protec-
tion against conviction of the blameless and
that the common law regards mens rea as a
universal requirement, technical and juris-
prudential difficulties are at an end. In terms
of due process this recognition simply means
... that statutes attempting to abolish a uni-
versal mens rea requirement--and these are
rather rare--are unconstitutional as are
judicial utterances, in the nature of judicial
legislation, to that effect. 9
On the other hand, Professor Packer noting the
pervasive use of strict-liability public welfare
offenses in this century, hesitates to commit him-
self to the proposition that strict liability always
and everywhere violates traditional notions of
ordered liberty."'
Advocates of the Mueller position are encour-
aged by cases like Robinson v. California,"' in
which a constitutional infirmity is found in the
punishment of moral innocents. 99 Perhaps the
statutory construction in Easter v. District of
Columbiae " is an added source of hope for them.
But strict liability offenders, unlike blameless
narcotic addicts and drunkards, engage in voluntary
activity that transgresses the law and are capable
of either performing the duty the law imposes or
withdrawing from the activity that is likely to
bring criminal penalties. This distinction was
perceived a half century ago when the Washington
Supreme Court rejected cases upholding public
welfare strict liability as precedents for holding
constitutional a legislative attempt to abolish the
defense of insanity.' 1
Those who believe that strict liability should
be declared unconstitutional were also encouraged
by Lambert v. California.2' Shortly after that de-
cision Mueller wrote:
"I Mueller, supra note 139, at 1103.
"'7 Packer, supra note 139, at 142.
193 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
191 See, e.g., Dublin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Pleafor a Due Process Concept of Criminal Responsibility,
18 STA. L. Rxv. 322, 385-87 (1966).
200 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
201 State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020
(1910).
2- 355 U.S. 225 (1957). This case involved a regis-
tration requirement for convicts dwelling in a city.
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MENTAL ATTITUDES IN CRIMINAL LAW
The Supreme Court has dearly told us that
it detests the misuse of criminal sanctions in
the case of a morally blameless defendant....
Absolute criminal liability is beginning to end
in America.20
But Mrs. Lambert's mistake was that she did
not know of the existence of a penal law, a mistake
of a fundamentally different character from the
mistakes involved in public welfare offenses. So
with the passage of time, Lambert has come to
stand only for the proposition that where an
affirmative duty is imposed on a citizen which he
would have no reason to suppose exists, and where
a violation of that duty requires no affirmative act,
the lawmakers must see that the act's promulga-
tion takes these circumstances into account. The
bright hopes enkindled by Lambert have been
dimmed.
It has also been suggested that decisions striking
down irrational statutory presumptions could serve
as precedents for declaring strict-liability offenses
unconstitutional. 214 But this analogy has merely
been asserted, with little articulation. It is doubt-
ful whether a line of cases that is itself so con-
fused 2 5 could illuminate another area of the
law.
It is, therefore, suggested that the simplest
approach would see the Supreme Court holding
that due process is offended whenever penalties
above a designated severity are imposed without
proof of an actual or substituted criminal mental
attitude toward the material elements of an offense.
A severity-of-the-punishment test finds support
in the Model Penal Code206 and in the Koczwara;'T
case, which both draw the line at imprisonment.
The new Illinois Criminal Code suggests that
normally a five-hundred dollar fine should be the
maximum penalty for strict-liability offenses. 2°8
The misdemeanor-felony line is also a possibility.209
203 Mueller, supra note 139, at 1130.2 4 See, e.g., Comment, 38 J. Cxns. L., C. & P.S.
132, 135-136 (1947).205 See Comment, The Constitutionality of Statutory
Criminal Presumnptio, 34 U. Cis. L. R!v. 141 (1966).
206 MODEL PENAL CODE §§1.04 (5), 2.05 (2) (Pro-
posed Official Draft, 1962).207 Commonwealth v. Koczwara 397 Pa. 575, 155
A.2d 825 (1959). See supra p. 19.
208 I.L. Rzv. STAT. ch. 38, §4-9 (1965).2109 Of course any test based on the severity of the
It has been useful in resolving other due process
issues, although admittedly future years may see
its erosion in those other areas. Once a balancing
approach is accepted, the notion that it is proper
to take some property and restrain some liberty,
but not more, by a certain means becomes less
offensive than at first glance.210 In the public wel-
fare cases many short imprisonments but few long
ones are recorded. Therefore, it could be maintained
that imprisonment without fault for more than a
year, but not for less, is inconsistent with our
traditional notions of ordered liberty. The possi-
bility of the most egregious abuses of strict-liabil-
ity would be ended. The Court, at some later date,
could draw a line more favorable to defendants.
CONCLUSION
In the areas examined, proof of intentionality,
recklessness, or negligence as to each non-juris-
dictional material element of a crime should be
required for conviction. Use of statutory language
that calls for proof of bad motivation or of knowl-
edge of a penal statute should be avoided. Some-
times the intent to commit one crime may be
substituted for the intent to commit another
crime, but the substitution is inappropriate when
it is used to deny the defense of reasonable mistake
is statutory rape cases. The complete dispensation
with the mental attitude requirement in bigamy
and public welfare offenses has not been demon-
strated to be sound policy. The defense of reason-
able mistake should be permitted in bigamy cases,
even if the mistake is one of civil law. Defendants
in public welfare cases should be allowed to excul-
pate themselves by showing that they used due
care. Finally, in bigamy and public welfare cases,
the Supreme Court should deem unconstitutional
heavy criminal penalties imposed without proof of
a criminal mental attitude.
penalty would require a reconsideration of United
States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922), where heavy
narcotic-offense penalties were implicity approved.
The opinion reveals that the Court did not give serious
consideration to the due process issue. It did not have
the benefit of counsel for the defendant since the govern-
ment was unopposed at the Supreme Court level in its
argument that the district judge erroneously quashed
the indictment.
210 Comment, 38 J. Citr. L., C. & P.S. 132, 136
(1947).
